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'hen the leading Western industrial countries decided in March 1973 to allow their currencies to float against the US dollar, they freed themselves from constraints that had long prevented them from pursuing an independent national policy? Although many players and observers were uncomfortable at the prospect of leaving exchange rates to be determined largely bythe free play of the market, the decision was generally greeted with relief. The pressure generated by repeated waves of currency speculation had become too great. Many saw floating only as a temporary measure, however; they believed there should be a return to a system of fixed exchange rates as soon as circumstances allowed, but one that took account of the weaknesses that had now come to light. 2 This did not happen. Instead, the world has learnt to live with flexible exchange rates, more of necessity than out of conviction, as the advocates of a system of fixed rates emphasize. Whatever the drawbacks of the present situation, however, a return to fixed rates does not seem advisable, given the experiences of the past twenty years.
In the light of experience with the Bretton Woods system, flexible exchange rates 3 were often seen initially as a panacea for the economic ills of the past. The primary advantage was considered to be that they insulated economies, and especially monetary policy, from disturbing influences from abroad. For example, during previous bouts of currency speculation the Europeans and Japanese had been obliged to accumulate massive dollar reserves, and the associated expansion in their domestic money supply had destroyed all hope of pursuing an effective stabilisation policy. Everybody realised that even with flexible exchange rates economies remained interdependent -via international price effects, for * Hamburg Institute for Economic Research (HWWA), Hamburg, Germany.
example -but the constraints were considered small by comparison with those under the Bretton Woods system. Flexible exchange rates were also expected to counter imbalances in the world economy by preventing exchange rate distortions from becoming as pronounced as in the past. It was claimed that the exchange rate mechanism itself worked in favour of equilibrium over the long term; as soon as a country recorded a current account surplus, the associated demand for its currency would lead sooner or later to a rise in its exchange rate and hence to a reduction in the surplus by increasing the prices of the country's exports in world markets and reducing the prices of imports.
Over the years a third advantage became discernible: freed from the need to subordinate economic and exchange rate policy to a common objective even in times of severe domestic economic and political constraints, the political players in the major industrial countries-heads of state and government, finance ministers and central bank governors-developed new forms of informal contact and new ways of reaching agreement, which were not restricted to monetary issues? This type of co-operation, which came to be known as "summit diplomacy", was seen 1 A vivid description of the events leading up to floating is to be found in H. van a Even at the outset, currencies never floated completely freely; instead, there was a hybrid form of"managed floating", in which the central banks intervened in the foreign exchange markets whenever they saw fit. With regard to the first few months after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, for example, see Bank for International Settlements, op. cit.
by most of those involved, at least initially, as a satisfactory and efficient means of collaboration that would also avoid the disadvantages of institutional obligations as under Bretton Woods.
The Return to Reality
Events soon proved, however, that flexible exchange rates could not live up to many of the expectations placed in them and had disadvantages of their own2 The first test came as early as the autumn of 1973, when the outbreak of the first oil crisis showed how vulnerable economies remained to external shocks, even under flexible exchange rates, and how much they were still interdependent, contrary to all expectations. This discovery was subsequently confirmed under conditions of divergent economic trends, the second oil price shock and the debt crisis of the eighties.
The hope that external imbalances would not become as pronounced as under the fixed exchange rates of the past was also disappointed. On the contrary: ever since the beginning of the eighties economic relations among the leading Western industrial countries have been dominated largely by the debate about the causes and effects of the enormous US "double deficit" in the federal budget and in the current account of the balance of payments. 8 The potential for conflict that this repeatedly generated, especially in relations with Europe and Japan, was one of the main reasons why the efforts at informal cooperation in international economic and monetary policy that had seemed so promising at the outset frequently came to nothing and the economic summits and G-7 meetings were i ncreasinglyin danger of degenerating into political circuses. 7
Additional problems also arose. The expansion of world trade, the explosive growth in the international financial and foreign exchange markets 8 and their increasing intemonnection as a result of the liberalisation of capital movements and the use of new EDP techniques and trading methods increased economic and economic policy interdependence. These factors also made it increasingly difficult for central banks to intervene in the markets to dampen exchange rate fluctuations and meant that intervention was less and less successful. Doubts began 
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to be voiced about the general effectiveness of exchange market intervention, and although the Plaza and Louvre Agreements gave temporary cause for optimism, in the end the credibilityof the guardians of currencies worldwide was seriously damaged?
Strong market growth, increasing international links and the development of new financing and trading instruments, some of them highly speculative, increased the system's vulnerability to shocks. This was reflected above all in extreme short-term exchange rate variability, which hardly anyone had expected on this scale. 1~ In addition, exchange rates did not adjust to the longer-term condition of the real economy in the countries concerned and help eliminate external imbalances, as had been expected, but for long periods remained far removed from the levels observers regarded as compatible with economic fundamentals.
Analytical Deficiencies
These completely unexpected and highly irritating developments made market operators and analysts alike extremely uncertain as to the real determinants of exchange rates. The accepted concepts of the monetary foreign trade theory appeared to have lost most of their validity. The underlying exchange rate trend did not seem to accord with long-term equilibrium, whether in terms of purchasing power parities or non-price "fundamental" determinants, nor did the short-term behaviour of exchange rates correspond to the models."
Exchange rate movements are traditionally explained with the help of linear equilibrium models, in which exchange rate fluctuations are caused mainly by exogenous disturbances. One of the main causes of such disturbances is the emergence of new information that forces a revision of expectations as to future exchange rate movements and leads to corresponding transactions. After all adjustments have taken place, the exchange rate again follows an equilibrium path in accordance with real economic conditions.
9 Doubts about what central banks could achieve by exchange market intervention had led the participants at the economic summit in Versailles in 1982 to commission a study on the effectiveness of currency intervention. The so-called Jurgensen Report reached an extremely pessimistic conclusion. When the G-7 countries proclaimed a common strategy for the dollar in the PlazaAgreement in 1985 and re-affirmed it in the Louvre Agreement in 1987, many observers assessed the situation much more favourably. In this regard, see also R. C. 
